On the 28 th of March 2015 the Chinese government published "VISION AND ACTIONS ON BUILDING the NEW SILK ROAD, jointly the ECONOMIC AND 21ST -CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD"
Introduction
China's bold hegemonically transformational project, is officially entitled "VISION AND ACTIONS ON Jointly BUILDING SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND 21ST-CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD", and publicly known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Drafted since March 2015, the document explains Beijing's aims to take greater control of global maritime spaces. In this regard, the project authors have identified two strategic axes that start in the South China Sea flowing to the Indian Ocean and to the Pacific Ocean respectively, which in combination are designed to create a maritime belt around AfroEurasia. For this purpose, as described in the aforementioned strategy, China will implement a plan to secure shipping routes that will unite ports located on the route of the two axes, for the purpose of strengthening China -Pakistan. and China -Myanmar -Bangladesh -India economic corridors. But this information and events in the South China Sea have redirected analysts' attention away from another Chinese global strategic objective represented by the insidious economic conquest and military securing of maritime straits, especially of maritime chokepoints responsible the overall management of naval, commercial and military flows and, in subsidiary, of the global shores.
Which are the main maritime straits covered by the Chinese "offensive"? Which are the geostrategic implications of this approach? STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE It is important to mention that the maritime routes around Cape Horn and Magellan Strait as well as the Cape of Good Hope are compulsory for heavy tonnage vessels that exceed the dimensions of Suez and Panama waterways.
To understand more clearly the impact of blocking these straits can be illustrated by analyzing global maritime oil traffic on daily basis. According to the US Energy Information Administration data, in the year 2013, over 50% of global oil was transported through maritime chokepoints. Of the 51.15 million barrels of oil transported daily, 33.2% representing 17 million barrels were transported through the Strait of Hormuz, 29.7%, representing 15.2 million barrels were transported via the Strait of Malacca, the rest to 100% being transported around the Cape of Good Hope -9.5%, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait -7.4%, the Danish straits -6.45%, Suez Canal -6.25%, the straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles -5.6 % and through the Panama Canal -1.66% (see map in Fig.1 ). From the above data, the most congested maritime chokepoint is the Hormuz strait, due to intense transit of oil tankers transporting crude oil from the Persian Gulf to global recipients. The second busiest maritime chokepoint is the Malacca strait. Between 70-80% of the ships transiting the Strait have China as a starting point or destination 3 . Thus China's critical interest in controlling this the South China Sea. Oil tanker traffic to Far Eastern customers (China, Japan, South Korea etc), the narrowness of the waterway and the laced shoreline topography have turned the Malacca Strait into the new "pirate alley". According to the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce, in 2014, there were 245 pirate attacks worldwide. Among these attacks 141 (57.55%) occurred in SouthEast Asia while only 55 (22.44%) occurred in African waters 4 . 
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Also, significant oil tanker traffic is registered through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal. Flanked by failed states like Somalia, Eritrea and Burundi on the one side and Yemen on the other side, Bab-el-Mandeb (with a width of only 18 nautical miles -33.3 km) and the Gulf of Aden were, until recently, the riskiest maritime destinations due to the increased incidence of pirate attacks and to the proliferation of terrorist networks. The risk of a regional security crisis and the impact upon Suez Canal maritime traffic has forced the international community to intervene to secure the area. Thus, in the last decade multinational military operations (NATO, EU and AU) 5 and national (the Russian Federation, China and India) were held in the area in order to combat maritime piracy 6 and terrorism. Subsequent to military interventions, starting with 2014, both maritime robbery and terrorist attacks of Al Shabaab and Al Qa'ida in the Arab Peninsula (the two most active Islamist organizations in the region) have considerably declined 7 . Regarding the Suez Canal, instability and the proliferation of Islamist movements' subsequent to Hosni Mubarak's regime fall in 2011, increased transiting vessels' security risk levels, as well the price of maritime insurance policies.
The most secure maritime chokepoints are the Danish Straits, the Turkish Straits and the Panama Canal. The Danish Straits are the compulsory shipping route for Russian oil. The Turkish Straits, whose narrowest point are but half a nautical mile (.926 km), facilitate Caucasian oil to transit to global recipients. As for the Panama Canal, it allows North and South American oil to transit to Eurasian clients. The recent lifting of the ban on US crude oil and natural gas export 8 will increase traffic through the Panama Canal (the first conclusive statistics regarding the volume and destinations of US exported crude oil are expected later this year).
Obviously, in these conditions a disruption of flows at any of the aforementioned maritime straits is automatically reflected in oil prices and, subsequently, the global economy. But, beside oil, other goods from liquefied gas and strategic minerals to all sort of commodities are transported through maritime chokepoints. For this reason, the control and security of maritime straits are imperatives for any major geopolitical player as energy, food, technology security are directly connected to the permeability of these waterways. Active Endeavour -NATO counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean Sea; Ocean Shield -NATO counter-maritime piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean; Atalanta -EU countermaritime piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean; Enduring Freedom Horn of Africa -US counter-terrorism and counter-maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden area; AU lead ongoing counter-terrorism operation in Somalia, starting with September 2014. These data should be read in conjunction with the territorial dispute in the South China Sea between China and the rest of the riparian states (Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines). The dispute concerns sovereignty over the Spratly, Paracel and Natuna Islands, the territorial waters, exclusive economic zones and their related maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Beijing's decision to build three artificial islands equipped with runways, ports and military bases in the Spartly Archipelago, followed by naval, terestrial and air interdiction for 24 
China funds reconstruction of fishing port in

CHINESE, NIGERIAN NAVIES CONDUCT FIRST-EVER JOINT MILITARY EXERCISE; ANTI-PIRACY DRILLS UNDERWAY,
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other riparian states to perform economic and military activities in the region, are based on a double stake:
1. economic -related to the right of ocean fishing, the right of hydrocarbon exploitation (11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic meters of natural gas), sub-marine strategic minerals exploitation, and control of the trade routes passing through the region 30 ;
2. strategic -control of maritime corridors that connect Southern and Northern Pacific Ocean, passing through Malacca chokepoint region.
Given the total volume of goods transiting the South China Sea worth $ 5.3 trillion annually 31 even a temporary lock of the maritime corridors would result in major economic consequences worldwide. No -fly zones in the South China Sea are already affecting smooth running of military and civilian transit in the region, and China's sovereignty claims over Northern Pacific islands, disputed with Japan -the islands of Senkaku/Diaoyu as well as with Japan and South Korea -Socotra islands, generated re-balancing formulas through geopolitical axis such as US -Vietnam -India, US -Taiwan -Japan -South Korea, USAustralia -New Zealand 32 .
The ports covered by the Chinese military plan target not only the major maritime chokepoints but also other straits that might otherwise become alternative routes should the main ones be blocked. In this respect, the main regions covered by the Chinese strategy are the Indonesian Archipelago and Malaysia, Philippine Archipelago, the island of Papua New Guinea, Australia, Andaman Archipelago, Malvinas Archipelago, Mozambique Channel, Zanzibar and Pemba straits.
1. Indonesia -contains a large number of side straits that can take over, if necessary, maritime traffic that might be diverted from the Strait of Malacca (see map in Figure 3) 33 . Among these ones there are Bangka Strait -between the islands of Sumatra and Bangka, Mentawai Strait -between the islands of Sumatra and Mentawai, Karim Strait -between the islands of Sumatra and Borneo (Kalimantan is the Indonesian part of the Borneo island), Singapore Strait -between Singapore and Sumatra and the Strait of Macassar -between the islands of Borneo and Sulawesi. This is how Chinese naval base location in the islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan, for example, exert direct influence not only upon the Straits of Malacca but also on the rest of the region, as can be seen in Fig.2 . Chinese military plans in Indonesian waters are supported by a strong community of Chinese nationals and companies operating in the region reunited in the so-called bamboo network 35 . According to the 2010 census, there are more than 2.8 million Chinese living in the Indonesian Archipelago, representing 1.2% of the total population of the country 36 . But unofficial sources claim that the number of ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia would reach between 10 and 12 million people, including some who are 3rd and 4th generation, but who declared themselves Indonesians.
The Bamboo network is a sort of Chinese Commonwealth built on business relationships between Chinese individuals and companies based in China and residents and Chinese companies operating in South-East Asia, in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. Gradually, the network extended to other global areas of Chinese interest, such as sub-Saharan Africa, for example. This business network of high political influence is a soft power, subversive vector, which is meant to ensure and to secure Chinese presence in the targeted areas.
2. Malaysia -and Indonesia share the control of Malacca Strait. In July 2016, China and Malaysia started negotiations for the construction of the third commercial port, located in Carey Island, between Port Klang and the Malacca Strait 37 . China is, already, building a container terminal in Port Klang next to the Malacca Straits, the 12th largest commercial port globally, and is interested in the free zone around it, too. China is also participating in the 34 
Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park development project in the Gebeng city which will transform Kuantan port, currently the petrochemical hub of Malaysia, into a logistical hub 38 . Moreover, Kuala Lumpur officials stated Malaysia's desire to participate in the "silk belt" project with six ports and to develop bilateral economic relations in many fields. 
Persian Gulf and Suez Canal
In late January 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited, as part of a diplomatic tour, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt, the main Middle East countries targeted by the Belt and Road Initiative 44 . Among these countries, Iran and Egypt control two of the major chokepoints, namely Hormuz Strait and the Suez Canal.
Persian Gulf
Saudi Arabia -the bilateral discussions have addressed three major themes: the cooperation in the energy sector and the opening of Yasref refinery (built by Chinese state company Sinopec and the Saudi company Aramco), the issue of Uyghur Islamism in Western China and the cooperation within the Belt and Road Initiative. According to Council on Foreign Relations, 32.2 million barrels of oil representing over 50% of daily global sea-borne traffic 45 pass through the Indian Ocean. Most of these oil tankers are coming from the Persian Gulf, where Saudi Arabia is the de facto leader of the Sunni monarchies.
Strait of Hormuz
Iran -is one of China's traditional partners in the region. During president Jinping visit in Tehran, were signed 17 memoranda on Iran's participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative 46 . But China's hegemonic ambitions must take into account Russian geopolitical interest in the region to which Iran is a critical pivot of the Russian inner security ring. Also Chinese strategists must consider Iran's Central Asia aims that are increasingly centered on the idea of restoring the ancient Persian Empire. These overlapping interests explain China's failure to take over the strategic Chabahar port in the Straits of Hormuz that was instead leased to the Indians 47 .
Suez Canal
Egypt -about 8% of the global cargo traffic pass via Suez Canal. This Canal shortens distances by 19% on the Singapore -New York route compared to the Panama Canal route,
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and by 42% on the Rotterdam -Persian Gulf route versus the Cape of Good Hope route 48 . During the Chinese president's visit in Cairo a number of bilateral agreements aimed at strengthening Egypt's participation in Belt and Road Initiative were concluded. Some of the agreements are related to bilateral cooperation in the development and expansion of the Suez Canal, construction of Egypt's new administrative capital 49 , and development of the ChinaEgypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, all based on a strategic partnership. Also, we should mention that Egypt's Sinai Peninsula affords a strategic position on the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba. Near the entrance to the Gulf coming at the Red Sea Cairo owns both the Tiran and Sanafir strategic islands which were the subject of a commercial transaction with Saudi Arabia early in 2016. But the Saudi-Egyptian agreement was contested in an Egyptian court and the transaction failed 50 . However, due to her ongoing economic crisis a future international offer to sell these islands might be launched by Egypt where China might be among other potential buyers.
Mediterranean Basin
The main Mediterranean countries targeted by the Chinese strategy are either located around Gibraltar Straits as Morocco, Spain and, adjacent Algeria; those around the Otranto Straits including Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro, or the Levantine basin states -seen as a component of a strategic axis with the nearby Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal -thus, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.
Straits of Gibraltar:
 Morocco -In May 2016, King Mohammed VI paid a state visit to China. On this occasion, 15 bilateral conventions were signed. Some of the conventions targeted port Tanger -Med and the adjacent free trade zone that lies in the immediate vicinity of the Gibraltar Straits 51 .  Spain -a Chinese company, COSCO Ports, the world's second largest port terminal operator, could be one of the participants in the international tender for the construction of the third cargo terminal in the port of Algeciras. The Port of Algeciras is located on the Northern Mediterranean shore opposite to the port of Tangier 52 also in the immediate vicinity of the Gibraltar Straits. According to auction organizers, after the deadline for tender submission on November 30, 2016, the identity of the bidders will become public. 
Turkish Straits and the Black Sea
The main countries targeted by the Chinese strategy are Turkey and Black Sea countries Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia.
 Turkey -during September 2015, COSCO Pacific and China Merchants Holdings
International bought a 65% interest in the Kumport terminal in the Ambarli port complex, the largest on Turkish territory. Ambarli port is located in the northwestern portion of the Sea of Marmara on the It is important to note that China's failure in the Black Sea region must be linked to geopolitical interests in the area where Russia and EU/NATO play out their competing spheres of influence.
Nordic Routes
Following the accelerated thawing of the Arctic ice cap northern sea routes will take away much of the traffic through the Suez Canal and Malacca Straits. In these circumstances, the Bering Strait, located between Alaska and Siberia, separating the Pacific Ocean from the Arctic Ocean, will become a future chokepoint of utmost importance as future Barentz, Iceland, Greenland ports, as well as ones located along the Arctic coastline will become operational.
But a major power in the region is the Russian Federation with which Beijing leaders are politically and economically cooperating within the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The relationship between the two emerging powers is marked by geopolitical competition in Central Asia, the Caucasuses, the Levant, the former Soviet satellites in Africa and potentially, in the Arctic areas belonging to Russian Federation's internal security ring covered by the "silk bridge".
In this context, the "cold peace" of the bilateral relations it is likely to turn into confrontation if there is no mutual understanding regarding division of spheres of influence between the two powers (the northern hemisphere for the Russian Federation and the Southern hemisphere to China) or if this understanding is violated. In this respect a nuance introduced by Sergei Alexandrovich Karaganov 62 , the author of Eurasian Union from Lisbon to Vladivostok project 63 which supports Russia pivoting to the East by integrating Eurasian Economic Union with the Silk Belt and Road, with China as a leader, not the hegemon, is advocated 64 .
Outside the Russian Federation, the main targets of the Chinese strategy in the region have been Iceland, Greenland, Norway and Finland. 78 desite recent modernization and enlargement. For now, the construction progress is sluggish due to financial problems, but the contract between the Nicaraguan government and the Chinese company remains in force. Also, the two sides pledged to build a future port on the Pacific Ocean whose profile (military and/or civilian) was not specified. -1943) , author of the Rimland Theory, and who was also known as the spiritual father of the containment policy, reformulated Raleigh's imperative saying that whoever controls the shores, dominates Eurasia and whoever dominates Eurasia, rules the world 85 . In this regard, Spykman said that human civilization is a civilization of water, developed along coastlines or rivers, access to the oceans being one of the motivations that unleashed the territorial expansion of continental states (such as Russia for example).
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Accepting the above theories makes it obviously that Beijing's global maritime strategy literally applies the principles of maritime domination described by Raleigh, Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman, in order to transform China into a global hegemon, as the following map suggests. Fig.4 map illustrates China's maritime chokepoints and her level of control along global shores. We observe the concentration both in the southern and northern hemispheres with the subsequent strategic consequences as described by the Rimland Theory and the comments of Raleigh, Thayer and Mahan. Fig.2 Chinese military plans also provide for bases located in the Gulf of Aden, Cape of Good Hope, Mozambique Channel, in the numerous maritime straits in the South China Sea, Andaman, Seychelles, Malvinas Archipelagos, and extending to West Africa in the Gulf of Benin. As we notice in Fig.4 , there is a significant Chinese economic presence adjacent to other two global chokepoints: the Panama Canal and the Turkish Straits, as well as to important strategic straits such as Gibraltar, Magellan, Cape Horn, the Mozambique Channel, and the many straits of Indonesian, Philippine, Andaman, Malvinas, Greek, and Caribbean Archipelagos. Also noted is the economic encirclement of the Danish straits, the only remaining out of Chinese military and/or economic control. Danish straits are vital for Russian oil traffic.
Danish straits absence from China's immediate strategic objectives list, as well as the failure of taking over Iranian Chabahar Port's management or the failure of taking over the Black Sea ports' economic control should be regarded as the result of a non-combat policy towards Russia with which Beijing does not want to tighten the relations, for the moment. If we analyze the situation in the Caribbean we see a concentration of Chinese investment in port facilities in the Bahamas and Cuba, which must be combined with those in Mexico, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama Canal. Given that the US has lifted the restriction on the export of hydrocarbons, it is obvious that American oil tankers will compulsory transit this region. Furthermore, the current Chinese economic growth in the Gulf of Mexico should be considered against the massive US investment in the same region from oil drilling stations to liquefied gas terminals and port facilities. These elements should be corroborated with statistics regarding oil traffic chokepoints and the level of Chinese involvement in the management of those state's main oil ports. But not only hydrocarbons are transported by sea corridors, many other goods from weapons to strategic mineral commodities are also transited through these ports. Therefore, it becomes obvious that we are witnessing China's global takeover of oil and commodity maritime traffic control, an aspect that will generate an unquestionable economic and strategic superiority.
Also, massive investments made by Chinese companies, mostly in emerging countries from Africa, Asia, Central and South America, became an important political and diplomatic instrument for China. This instrument can pressurize governments, through the impact on national security whenever bilateral dysfunctions may occur (i.e. impact on national economy by increasing of the unemployment, impact on the GDP volume, on the monetary policy stability). Similarly, should China choose to disrupt traffic through the any of the aforementioned straits could quickly cause a global economic crisis. These elements should not be overlooked given that China And, last but not least, Chinese military interdiction in the South China Sea and the translation of the local dispute into a "law fare" action, where international legal resolutions are not respected, could threaten commerce and security. Consequently, if China were successful in a military takeover of global maritime chokepoints, the impact on economic, political and global security will be significant.
It is important to note that the Chinese strategy is a smart-power one, following a sequence of steps:  first step is always an application of soft-power starting with an economic takeover through the purchase of shares/concession in a enterprise in exchange for investment in modernization/expansion of the host country's industrial assets, as well as investments in infrastructure and other economic sectors;  second step is the strengthening political relations through a policy with unethical constraints (i.e. relationship between China and Omar al Bashir's Sudanese administration. Omar al Bashir has been convicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Darfur 88 );
